Abstract-We consider two prominent mechanisms for the electricity market; the pay-as-bid mechanism, currently applied in certain control reserve markets, and the proposed VickreyClarke-Groves mechanism, an established auction mechanism used in advertising and spectrum auctions, for example. Bringing in tools from game theory and auction theory, we compare the Nash equilibria of these two mechanisms in terms of social efficiency and strategic behavior of the players. Furthermore, by formulating a coalitional game corresponding to the electricity market, we propose alternative mechanisms that incentivize truthful bidding while ensuring shill bidding is not profitable. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms in a case study based on electricity market data.
I. INTRODUCTION
The liberalization of the electricity markets presents opportunities and challenges to ensure stability and improve the efficiency of the power grid. Hence, there has been a surge of research activities from the control community on studying various electricity markets [1] - [3] . To ensure stability of the grid frequency, supply and demand of electricity need to be balanced in every instance of time. Various intra-day, realtime and control reserve markets are designed to guarantee this balance. The role of these markets is increasingly important due to the integration of volatile renewable energy into the grid [4] . Our objectives in this paper are to lay out a game theoretic framework to analyze a subset of the existing market mechanisms and to explore alternative mechanisms with potential improvements.
Previous work on game theoretic analysis of electricity markets focuses on locational marginal pricing (LMP) mechanisms [5] - [7] . LMP sets nodal electricity prices, hence, it is specialized for markets that consider network constraints, such as North America. In the majority of electricity markets in Europe, such as Switzerland [8] , payments are equal to the bid prices; this is defined as the pay-as-bid mechanism. As an example, this mechanism is implemented in control reserve markets that include various types of ancillary services such as primary, secondary, and tertiary. In the electricity market literature, analysis of the pay-as-bid mechanism involves its comparison with the uniform pricing mechanisms [9] . In a pay-as-bid mechanism, a rational player would overbid to ensure profit. To the best of our knowledge, the analysis of such strategic behavior is not extended to the electricity markets. Hence, our first goal is to analyze the pay-as-bid mechanism by bringing in and advancing game theoretic tools [10] .
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As an alternative to the aforementioned mechanisms, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism possesses dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility, that is, it is optimal for every participant to bid their true cost [11] - [13] . Variants of this mechanism have been successfully deployed in spectrum auctions [14] and advertising auctions, for instance, by Facebook [15] . Recent works applied the VCG mechanism to various electricity markets [16] - [19] . Despite all the good properties, coalitions of participants can influence the VCG mechanism to increase their utilities. As is outlined in auction theory literature [20] , the pathologies of the VCG mechanism occur when the payments are not in the core. The core is a concept from coalitional game theory, in which the payments eliminate the incentives for leaving the grand coalition. Recently, this property of the core has motivated the design of the core selecting mechanisms that project the VCG payments to the core [21] , [22] .
Electricity markets and auctions for multiple items share many similarities. Electricity markets can be considered as reverse auctions. This motivates us to bring in tools, such as the core, from the auction theory. In contrast to auctions, electricity markets involve continuum values of different power supplies, e.g., control reserves are classified depending on the amount of time they require to deliver the energy. Furthermore, to clear the market, certain constraints, such as those of the network and the balance of supply and demand need to be guaranteed. In our developments, we consider these conceptual differences. Hence, our second goal is to apply the VCG and the core selecting mechanisms to the electricity markets under consideration. Furthermore, we compare the strategic behavior of players and market efficiency under these mechanisms to those corresponding to the pay-as-bid mechanism.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows. First, we introduce a constrained optimization problem that models a general class of electricity markets. Second, we derive Nash equilibria of the electricity markets under the pay-asbid mechanism. Third, we show that at a Nash equilibrium, the total payment by the market operator in the pay-as-bid mechanism is less than the one for the VCG mechanism. Finally, we propose alternative mechanisms to incorporate benefits of both the VCG and the pay-as-bid mechanisms while avoiding their potential problems. These mechanisms promote truthful bidding, protect against strategic manipulations and reduce total payments made by the system operator.
Notation: We denote the set of nonnegative real numbers by R + . Given a vector x ∈ R t , we define x −i ∈ R t−1 by omitting the i th entry and more generally, we denote by x −S if the entries to be omitted are from the set S ⊂ {1, . . . , n}.
The vector of zeros is denoted by 0. We use the notation x ≥x, to indicate that
nt be a stacked vectors with x i ∈ R t , i = 1, . . . , n. In this case, we define x −S by omitting the vectors from the set S.
II. ELECTRICITY MARKET SETUP
We start with a generic electricity market model. Let there be t types of power supplies in the auction. These types can include different types of control reserves (positive, negative, secondary, tertiary) and power injection at different locations and time steps. The set of participants L consists of the system operator, l = 0, and the bidders, l = 1, . . . , |L| − 1. Each bidder l has a true cost c l (x) ∈ R + for providing the power supply x ∈ R t + , which is a private information. A bidder's cost for providing zero units of power supply is zero, c l (0) = 0, ∀l. We assume that the cost curve is nondecreasing, that is, for all
Each bidder l submits a nondecreasing bid b l (x) ∈ R + to the system operator for power supplies x ∈ R t + . Rather than a bid curve, in many market mechanisms, a bidder can offer a set of bids, of which only one can be accepted. For instance, bidder l submits bids for m l discrete reserve sizes as {b
Even though the offers are indivisible, reserve sizes up to the size of the winning bid must be available to the operator throughout the week. Therefore, we define an equivalent representation of the form
In this setting, the bid prices are piecewise constant and continuous from the left.
Definition 1: Given the strategy profile B = {b l (·)} l∈L\{0} , a mechanism defines the quantities accepted with an allocation function x * (B) ∈ R t(|L|−1) + and a payment to each bidder l with a payment rule p l (B) ∈ R + .
The utility of bidder l is
+ is the quantity that is accepted from bidder l. The system operator's objective function is
The variable x ∈ R t(|L|−1) + is the allocation and y ∈ R p can be any additional variables entering the system operator's optimization and D : R
For example, in a two stage market, y could correspond to the second stage decision variables [8] . In most electricity markets, the objective is to minimize the cost of procurement subject to certain constraints:
where g : R
(If the above optimization is infeasible then J(B) = ∞.) Let us assume that in case of multiple optima, there is some tiebreaking rule that breaks ties according to a predetermined fixed ordering of the bidders. The total payment made by the system operator is given by
which is treated as the utility of the system operator. The constrained optimization problem (1) defines a general class of auction models, where the prices from bids do not enter the constraints, that is, g(x, y; L) ≤ 0. Several current market problems such as the stochastic market mechanism in [8] and energy-reserve co-optimized markets in [16] can be cast as the market model in (1) . The constraints may correspond to procurement of the required amounts of control reserves, e.g., in the Swiss control reserve markets accepted reserves must have a deficit probability of less than 0.2%. They may also correspond to a transmission network, e.g., in the energy markets, power injections must satisfy the transmission line limits and the power-flow equations. In order to discuss payment rules applicable to the electricity markets, we first bring in tools from game theory.
Definition 2: The strategy B l is a best response to
Definition 3: The strategy profile B is a Nash equilibrium if B l is a best response to B −l for every bidder l.
Definition 4: The strategy profile B is a dominantstrategy Nash equilibrium if for every bidder l,
That is regardless of the bids of other players it is always optimal to play B l . Moreover, this equilibrium is dominant-strategy incentivecompatible (D.S.I.C) if B l = c l (·) for every bidder. Namely, every bidder also finds it more profitable to bid truthfully.
A. Payment rules
We introduce the pay-as-bid mechanism and the VCG mechanism for the electricity market. Under both mechanisms, a bidder whose bid is not accepted is paid nothing.
In the pay-as-bid mechanism, the payment rule is given
. A rational bidder would overbid to ensure profit. Consequently, under the pay-as-bid mechanism, system operator minimizes inflated bids rather than the true costs. Thus, this mechanism cannot guarantee that the winners are the producers with the lowest true cost. Furthermore, the bidders need to spend resources to learn how to bid to maximize their utility. In Section III-B, we derive the Nash equilibria of the pay-as-bid mechanism.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is characterized with a different payment rule:
, and J(B −l ) denotes the minimum aggregate cost without bidder l, i.e., the optimal value of the optimization problem in (1) with x l = 0. This mechanism is well-defined under the assumption that there exists a feasible solution when a bidder is removed. Each winner gets the additional payment of
Given the auction model (1), it has been shown that the VCG mechanism is a D.S.I.C mechanism. For an exposition to these results, please see [17, Theorem 1] . Consequently, it becomes easier for entities to enter the auction, without spending resources in computing optimal bidding strategies. Furthermore, the equilibrium outcomes are efficient, that is, the sum of all the utilities, l∈L π l (B), is maximized and the winners are the bidders with the lowest costs.
Despite many advantages of the VCG mechanism for the electricity market in (1), this mechanism suffers from a number of pathologies such as shill bidding and collusion.
Example 1: We consider a simplified reserve auction. Suppose system operator has to procure 800 MW of reserves from bidders 1, 2 and 3. Bids and payments are provided in Table I . Suppose bidders 1 and 2 change their bid prices to 0 CHF for 400 MW. Then, bidders 1 and 2 become winners and each receive a payment of 600 CHF. In fact, bidders 1 and 2 could represent multiple identities of a single losing bidder (i.e. a bidder whose true cost is greater than 600 CHF for 800 MW). Entering the market with two shill bids, this bidder receives a payment of 2 × 600 CHF for 800 MW. For the system operator, the total payment is the primary concern. Therefore, it is troubling that the VCG mechanism can result in large payments even when the procurement cost is low. Our goal is now to analyze the strategic behavior that can arise in the pay-as-bid mechanism and propose alternative mechanisms to ensure joint benefits of both mechanisms.
III. GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET SETUP
We first characterize the Nash equilibria of the pay-asbid mechanism. Our results follow closely from the auction literature [23] . In our derivations, we are mindful of the constrained optimization problem that arises specifically in electricity markets. We first define possible bidding strategies. A semi-truthful strategy is implemented by inflating the true cost with a fixed amount of utility:
We can show that it is sufficient for bidders to consider semitruthful strategies as their best responses.
Lemma 1: There exists a semi-truthful strategy that is a best response of bidder l to B −l under the pay-as-bid mechanism for the optimization problem in (1) .
Proof: Assume that b l (·) is a best response of bidder l to B −l and that it yields the utility π *
is also a best response of bidder l and it yields the same utility.
, B −l ) = 0 when other bidders' strategies are given by B −l .
We first define the cost of procurement when bidder l is allocated z by using the semi-truthful strategy b
We have that b
is allocated some quantity x l = 0 when other bidders' strategy is given by B −l . This strategy yields π * l > 0. The case of π * l = 0 is straightforward and it can be achieved by a truthful strategy. Therefore, we can conclude the existence of a semi-truthful strategy that is a best response of bidder l.
The result above will be used in the next Section to characterize the strategies that attain Nash equilibria of the pay-as-bid mechanism. To this end, we first bring in tools from coalitional game theory into our analysis.
A. Core as a competitive outcome
In coalitional game theory, the core is the set of utility allocations that cannot be improved upon by forming coalitions. Our motivation for studying core is twofold. First, we see that the core can characterize the Nash equilibria of the pay-asbid mechanism. Second, the core outcomes are competitive, that is, shill bidding and collusion are eliminated for the losing bidders [17] .
For any S ⊂ L, let J(S) be the objective value under the coalition S where all bidders are truthful. We then define w : 2 |L| → R, the coalitional value function as follows: w(S) is zero if the system operator is not a member of the coalition S; 0 / ∈ S. Otherwise, it is defined by the following expression:
−w(S) = J(S) = min x,y: g(x,y;S)≤0 l∈S\{0}
c l (x l )+D(x, y; S). (2) Note that w(R) ≤ w(S) for R ⊆ S. Next, we define the core with respect to the true cost. For the remainder, we refer to it solely as the core.
The equality constraint ensures that the mechanism is efficient. An allocation is unblocked if there is no set of players that could make a deal on their own from which all of them would benefit. This condition is satisfied by the inequality constraint, and ensures that the core outcomes are competitive. The core is always nonempty because the utility allocation π 0 = w(L) and π l = 0 for all l ∈ L \ 0 always lies in the core. Example 2: Revisiting Example 1, suppose the true cost of bidders 1, 2 and 3 are 100 CHF for 400 MW, 400 CHF for 400 MW and 600 CHF for 800 MW. Assume that, in case of a tie, the operator prefers bidders 1 and 2. We can visualize the core outcomes for the bidders 1 and 2 by removing the losing bidder 3, p 3 = 0, and the operator. Core outcomes and the VCG payments (p VCG l ) are given in Figure 1 . 
B. Equilibrium under the pay-as-bid mechanism
To derive the Nash equilibria, we define the points in the core that are preferable to bidders. A utility allocation π ∈ Core(L, w) is Pareto-optimal if there are nõ π ∈ Core(L, w) withπ = π such thatπ −0 ≥ π −0 . In Figure 1 , the set of Pareto-optimal points correspond to the line segment of the core with maximum total payment. These points form the Nash equilibria of the electricity market.
Theorem 1: Suppose utility allocation π ∈ Core(L, w) is Pareto-optimal. Then, under the pay-as-bid mechanism, the strategy profile B = {b π k k (·)} l∈L\{0} is a Nash equilibrium for the auction in (1).
Proof: To derive the proof, we utilize the development in [23, Theorem 4] . Our proof is different due to our particular setup which is a reverse auction, a pay-as-bid mechanism and involves a general constrained optimization.
A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if and only if there is no unilateral profitable deviation from any of the bidders. We show that it is indeed true for B = {b
To this end, we restrict the bidders to semi-truthful strategies. This is a direct result from Lemma 1.
We start by considering deviations from the losing bidders. Let W denote the winning coalition. It follows from π ∈ Core(L, w) that any bidder k / ∈ W is bidding truthfully b
. Then, unilateral decrease is not profitable and the losing bidders would risk making losses. In case of a unilateral increase, they still remain losers.
If a winning bidder deviates by decreasing its bid, its utility also decreases. Hence, we only need to consider unilateral increase. Next, we show that there exist no bidder l ∈ W who earnsπ l > π l by a unilateral increase using the strategy bπ l l (·). LetB denote this new strategy profile. First, we see that the strategy profileB results in a new set of winners. Indeed, if the set of winners remains the same, this implies the existence of a point (π l , π −l ) ∈ Core(L, w). This contradicts the Pareto-optimality of π. Hence, the unilateral increase by bidder l leads to a new set of winnersW . Now, we assume that l ∈W . For all bidders k ∈W and k = l, pay-as-bid implies that their utility is given byπ k = π k . For all bidders k / ∈W , we haveπ k = 0. Second, since π is Pareto-optimal, there exists a coalition S l with w(S) = k∈S π k such that the inequality in Definition 5 is tight for the coalition S. Otherwise, for some , there exists a point in the core where bidder l earns π l + and the system operator makes the total payment π 0 − while utilities of other bidders are fixed. This new point would dominate π −0 , contradicting the Pareto-optimality of π. Next, we show that the coalition S yields a better objective value thanW for the auction in (1) under the strategy profileB. This would contradict the hypothesis thatW is the winning coalition which would conclude that bidder l is not a winner after the unilateral deviation, because l / ∈ S. LetĴ(S) be the objective value under the set of bidsB S , andĴ(W ) be the objective value under the set of bidsBW .
J(S) = min x,y:
g(x,y;S)≤0 k∈S\{0}
The equality (3a) follows from the definition ofĴ(S) and
Note that there may be bidders who are not allocated any quantity from the optimization in (3a). The inequality (3b) follows from this observation. The strict inequality (3c) follows from the fact that for l we havẽ π l > π l . The equality (3d) follows from the selection of the set S. The inequality (3e) follows from π ∈ Core(L, w). The equality (3f) follows from the definition of the setW which is the set of winners underB or equivalentlyBW . We can conclude that the coalition S yields a better objective value, hence, bidder l is not a winner, it does not earnπ l > π l .
In conclusion, for a Pareto-optimal utility allocation π ∈ Core(L, w) and its inherent semi-truthful strategy profile B, there is no unilateral profitable deviation from any of the bidders. Therefore, it is a Nash equilibrium.
The result above characterizes Nash equilibria of the payas-bid mechanism for the market model in (1). As we have shown in Lemma 1, limiting bidders to these strategies is not a restriction. However, there also do exist other inadmissible Nash equilibria when the losing bidders bid less than their true cost functions [23] . We rule these strategies out, assuming bidder rationality. As such, for the remainder, we focus on the subset of Nash equilibria which are Paretooptimal core outcomes.
The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium of the VCG mechanism in terms of the core payments.
Theorem 2: Let π VCG l denote bidder l's VCG utility under truthful bidding. Then, for every bidder l, π
Proof: The proof follows that of [23, Theorem 5] , and is omitted in the interest of space.
We should note that the VCG utility allocation π VCG may not be in the core. Under the ideal case that players could converge to a Nash equilibrium, this theorem shows that for every bidder, the utility under the pay-as-bid mechanism is at most equal to the one under the VCG mechanism. This inequality also holds for the total payment.
Corollary 1: The VCG utility π VCG l lies in the core if and only if there is a unique Pareto-optimal point in the core. In this case, this Pareto-optimal point is the unique equilibrium of both the VCG and the pay-as-bid mechanisms.
This corollary follows directly from Theorem 2. If the VCG utility does not lie in the core, there are multiple Nash equilibria for the pay-as-bid mechanism.
As we have discussed, core outcomes prevent shill bidding and collusion in the VCG mechanism, because they eliminate the incentives for forming coalitions. It has been wellestablished in the auction literature that the VCG utility π VCG l is in the core if and only if the coalitional value function w is submodular [20] . However, it is hard to characterize what conditions on the constrained optimization problem (1) makes the coalitional value function submodular. Furthermore, such conditions impose restrictions on the bids and the constraint set. For instance, simplified market in Example 1 is submodular if true cost is marginally nondecreasing for all quantities and for all bidders, see [17, Theorem 3] .
Example 3: Going back to Example 1 and Example 2, assume bidder 3 provides the truthful bid: 300 CHF for 400 MW and 600 CHF for 800 MW. In this case, true cost is marginally nondecreasing for all bidders. Suppose bidders 1 and 2 change their bids to 0 CHF for 400 MW. Then, bidders 1 and 2 become winners and each receives a payment of 300 CHF. In this case, shill bidding is not profitable for both bidders 1 and 2. Furthermore, we can now show the existence of the unique Nash equilibrium for the pay-as-bid, 300 CHF for 400 MW to bidder 1 and 400 CHF for 400 MW to bidder 3.
C. Bidder optimal core selecting mechanisms
We investigate further payment mechanisms that are immune to the pathologies of shill bidding and collusion without any restrictions on the market. We underline that the coalitional value function in (2) can be defined with respect to the submitted bids. In this section, when we talk about the core, we refer to the one with respect to the submitted bids.
It has been shown in the literature that a core selecting mechanism eliminates shill bidding from the auction [21] . As the name suggests, a core selecting mechanism chooses payments from the core with respect to the submitted bids.
For instance, pay-as-bid is a core selecting mechanism that selects the minimum utility for the bidders from the core.
A core selecting auction minimizes tendencies to deviate from truthful strategies, among all other core selecting mechanisms, if and only if the mechanism chooses a Paretooptimal utility allocation [21, Theorem 4] . We call such mechanisms bidder optimal core selecting (BOCS) mechanisms. Invoking Corollary 1, we can conclude that the VCG and BOCS mechanisms are equivalent if the coalitional value function is submodular. If this condition holds, the truthful bidding strategies become the dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium of the BOCS mechanism.
As we already discussed, there can be multiple Paretooptimal core points. From this set of points, we pick the allocation that minimizes the Euclidean distance to the VCG outcome [22] . Such mechanisms are successfully deployed in the spectrum auctions in the UK and Switzerland [22] . We can compute a Pareto-optimal outcome by solving a convex program over the set of linear constraints that define the core. However, it is computationally difficult for auctions involving many winners because the number of core constraints increases exponentially with the number of winners, see our paper [17, Lemma 1].
IV. NUMERICAL CASE STUDY Our goal is to compare effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms based on historic electricity market data. The following simulations are based on the bids placed in the 46th weekly Swiss reserve procurement auction of 2014 under a pay-as-bid mechanism. In this particular week, there are 21 power plants bidding for secondary reserves. The outcome of the market according to a two stage auction [8] is to procure 409 MW of secondary reserves for that week. Based on this, we now assume that the system operator has to procure 409 MW of secondary reserves in a single stage auction. We consider this simplified model because the optimal cost computations take significantly less time than the two stage auction in [8] .
The corresponding total payments π 0 of the pay-as-bid mechanism, the bidder optimal core selecting mechanism, and the VCG mechanism are shown in the first column of Table II. All the mechanisms lead to the same allocation as expected. We note that these mechanisms would lead to different game theoretic behaviors in a repeated setting, which we have not modeled. We observe that the VCG payment rule yields the highest total payment and the BOCS yields the second highest. This is a direct result of Corollary 1. Consequently, the VCG outcome is not in the core.
Since in a pay-as-bid mechanism, a rational bidder would overbid, it is not trivial to estimate the true costs based on the past data. We now scale all the bid prices down by 5%, and assume that those were the true costs of the bidders. Given that the outcome of the BOCS mechanism is a Paretooptimal utility allocation in the core, the total payment of the BOCS mechanism will now be the total payment players can create in the Nash equilibrium of the pay-as-bid mechanism by inflating their bids. This is a direct result of Theorem 1. The corresponding total payments of the mechanisms are shown in the second column of Table II. The total payments from the system operator turn out to be proportional, as is expected. If the BOCS mechanism can motivate the bidders to lower their prices down by this amount, it would be beneficial for the system operator in terms of the cost of procurement. Since the payments are in the core, the BOCS mechanism would be immune to shill bidding. Therefore, this mechanism keeps the benefits of the current pay-as-bid mechanism implemented in the Swiss reserve market. Furthermore, it promotes truthful strategies. On the other hand, for the total payments by the market operator under the VCG mechanism to coincide with the pay-as-bid, the true costs must be at least 8% lower than the reported values. The bidders may also form coalitions on their own under the VCG mechanism.
The mixed-integer optimization problems are solved with GUROBI [24] , called through MATLAB via YALMIP [25] , on a computer equipped with a 32 GB RAM and a 4.0 GHz Intel i7 processor. Simulations for the BOCS mechanism had a computation time of 1321.73 seconds, while the VCG mechanism was solved in 31.24 seconds. The reasons for this time difference is twofold. First, there are 11 winners and the BOCS mechanism requires the computation of the optimal cost for 2 11 different coalitions to generate the core constraints, whereas the VCG mechanism requires only 12. Second, the BOCS mechanism requires a convex optimization problem for the quadratic payment rule. This final step involves a quadratic program with 21 variables, 2069 linear inequality constraints and 10 equality constraints. Note that this can be solved in less than 1 second.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced a constrained optimization problem that models a broad class of electricity markets. We developed a game theoretic analysis of these electricity markets in order to analyze the payments and strategic behaviors that can arise in the pay-as-bid mechanisms and the VCG mechanisms. We showed that the Nash equilibria of the pay-asbid mechanism are characterized by the Pareto-optimal core outcomes. We investigated alternative payment mechanisms to mitigate the problems associated with both VCG and payas-bid mechanisms. We verified our results based on single stage electricity procurement auctions.
We are currently looking at the development of conditions that imply submodularity for the generic market model and the efficient computation methods for the core selecting mechanisms. As an extension, we consider exploring learning Nash equilibria in such markets to model the behavior of the bidders in a repeated setting.
